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Brazil's Foreign Policy in the Emerging Multipolar World: Data-Driven Strategic Positioning within BRICS and Beyond

Muhammad Rizwan, Raja Shehryar, Asia Karim

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Muhammad Rizwan, Raja Shehryar & Asia Karim are currently affiliated with Department of International Relations, MY university, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Email: rizwanmukhtar97@gmail.com

Email: shetryarsince94@gmail.com

Email: dr.asia@myu.edu.pk

Abstract

In the multipolar world, Brazil's foreign policy faces complex geopolitical realities as a part of its strategy to expand its global influence and economic presence. On another front, Brazil considers itself one of the leading countries in the Global South. It has partnered with BRICS to call for better transport, and help has a say in running the world (power balance) instead of being overruled by Western powers. Brazil demonstrates regional leadership by actively participating in initiatives like the New Development Bank and organizations such as MERCOSUR, CELAC, and BRICS, emphasizing its commitment to sustainable development and regional cooperation. The plan is to broaden Brazil's regional power reach, seeking economic and diplomatic relations throughout the planet. Brazilian foreign policy is characterized by a pragmatic search for equidistance, maximizing economic possibilities and strategic ties without ever fully committing to any one bloc or country. These measures will increase Brazil's clout on global issues and solidify the country as a critical factor in shaping a more equitable and representative international order.

Corresponding Author*

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INTRODUCTION

World politics is increasingly complex and dynamic. A decade ago, one might predict changes in global politics, but today, the scenery is even less predictable. In the last two decades of the 20th century, we have witnessed a shift from bipolar international relations to a unipolar system centered on the U.S.A. Since then, global politics have essentially been one of the West, with the U.S., Britain, and some other NATO countries calling the shots. NATO—with U.S. leadership—fought the wars in Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001) in disregarding the views of the United Nations Security Council and the world. This behavior makes clear that a unilateral world order based on one country threatens world peace due to its desire for checks and balances. After the bipolar world order collapsed, no other nations rose to challenge the U.S. dominance than Russia and China did until 2008 with the Russo-Georgian War. This conflict was Russia's meeting with forced U.S. allies Georgians under the pretext of protecting Russian speakers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the other postwar era, Russia is beginning to upend Western views as its growing economic, military, and political clout registers upon international affairs. Brazil is yet another emerging great power. With a high degree of political and economic reforms, Brazil is positioning itself to join Russia, China, and India as future constituent pillars of a multisectoral world system. Brazil's successive governments have sought to enhance international influence and regional leadership in Latin America within a multipolar world. While Beijing advocates for a fairer global system that aligns with Brazil's national interests, particularly in aiding developing nations, Brazil's ultimate

goal within BRICS is to reform global governance institutions, challenging the power dynamics of entities like the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund. Hence, they better reflect this new constellation of great powers. It also indicates Brazil's intention to become recognized as a world leader in recuperating neglected rights in developing nations, such as trade and intellectual property (Stuenkel, 2019). BRICS platform: Brazil has used this platform to strengthen its economic networking, seeking to foster solidarity with Third World countries, principally in traders, investment, and aid (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022). Such an approach has included encouraging regional integration, coordinating policy responses to common challenges, and developing ways to neutralize, even if recognition is given, the influence exerted on Latin America by external forces (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022). Brazilian relations with China and Russia have also been influenced by its policy on the BRICS front (Stuenkel, 2019). Brazil seeks to increase its economic collaboration and enhance coordination with these countries while trying to manage the numerous potential conflicts and nuances stemming from a multipolar global system (Stuenkel, 2019). Brazil's foreign policy has encountered a persistent problem in maintaining a fine balance between its ties with traditional Western allies such as the United States and the European Union (Malamud, 2021).

On the other hand, if we look at existing records from various Brazilian administrations, we can see that Brazil is doing its best to clarify multilateralism's importance and significance (Stuenkel, 2019). Brazil's ability to exert global power has been hampered by fiscal constraints, economic volatility, and polarized domestic politics (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022). However, Brazil has stressed that relations allow less talk and more action (Stuenkel, 2019). Now, with this Dessert, an extremely low estimate could be devoured in one bite--even an entire day hollowed out! It simply doesn't follow nature's laws (Malamud, 2021). In the evolving multipolar world, Brazil's future foreign policy will likely see increased global influence, regional leadership aspirations, and the objective of promoting a redesigned global governance system (Malamud, 2021). In order to navigate through the intricate network of interests and alliances in this ever-changing geopolitical landscape, Brazil must clasp astute diplomacy and put forward both a strategic approach and process for implementing its national interests (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022).

Brazilian Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective

Since the start of the 20th century, Brazil has actively sought global recognition as an important international player. In seeking to give its influence more breadth and depth, Brazilian foreign policy has employed soft power, adhered to international law, and embraced multilateralism. According to Gelson da Fonseca (1998), Brazil pursued three principal international policies throughout the Cold War. From the beginning, this arrangement resulted in Brazil setting up a strategic partnership with the United States based on the 'Western Pure' paradigm. This would involve close alignment with Western principles. From President Vargas, it then developed into the 'Qualified Western' period, which Jânio Quadros also entered. The 'Qualified Western' period was characterized by aligning Brazil with Western countries but adopting a nuanced stance toward the United States. Finally, under President João Goulart and Geisel, the 'Autonomous Western' model emerged, with its emphasis on various relationships and a self-reliant foreign policy. Brazil saw new challenges and new opportunities after the end of the Cold War. The structural transformations in many areas, such as globalization and crises of the Third World,

required foreign policy reform. The Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration was a period of pragmatic institutionalism emphasizing economic liberalization and multilateralism (Pinheiro, 2002). Brazil has consistently supported the principles of self-determination, non-intervention, cooperative nationalism, and peaceful conflict resolution. This is documented in Lafer (2001), Pinheiro (2002), and Lima (2010).

Brazilian foreign policy was pursued in the Lula and Cardoso administrations from entirely different approaches, although both aimed at increasing the country's global influence. So, while Cardoso's administration aimed mainly to establish credibility by actively participating in events, the Lula administration emphasized autonomy and strategic partnerships for such activities (Vigevani, Cepalune, 2007). The debate over Brazil's foreign policy focuses mainly on two primary models: one model aims to build up international credibility through multilateralism and internal reform, whereas the other emphasizes strategic alliances and national development with an autonomous approach (Hirst, 2008; Lima, 2010). This reveals Brazil's constant attempt to harmonize global integration and preservation--of national sovereignty and autonomy in formulation.

Brazil and the BRICS

In 2001, Jim O'Neil published a paper entitled "Building Better Global Economic BRICs." He acknowledged Brazil as an emerging power, like Russia, India, and China. O'Neil predicted that Brazil would have a substantial impact on the world economy. In the 1990s, Brazil tied down a vital loose link in economic reform and shifted its foreign policy so that it no longer polarized into a series of repetitive crises that ran through almost all other South American countries near that time. During Cardoso's presidency, Brazil successfully implemented economic stabilization and foreign policy reforms to gain a parvenu worldwide. The government made a concerted effort to change the image of a country that the military regime had shaped. It established close and active ties with international regimes, particularly in human rights issues, environmental policies, and the control of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Itamaraty decided to define five major foreign policy areas to make a prominent international participant. Three of these axes made their top priority countries with which Brazil has historically solid links: Mercosur, the United States, Europe, the Pacific Region (especially Japan), and other influential regional countries. As a result, these partners later took part in the BRICS forum (Lessa, 1998). As a regional power, Brazil made a point of actively seeking out partnerships with other countries of comparable stature in order to protect its interests and increase international clout. The country was pre-1990s already in contact with certain countries of BRICS. Brazil, for example, has a relationship with China. This close partnership—which began in the 1980s when they were still bitter enemies who knew relatively little about each other — predates You Shading and Valery Dmitriev. On December 11, 1974, China agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Brazil. A "General Agreement" between Brazil and China was thus signed in aerospace in Beijing on August 15, 1974; China and Brazil collaborated as early as 1988 with the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS-1). By 1993, the two had succeeded in launching five satellites, while a 6th is scheduled to be put into orbit next year: the first collaboration that will bear fruit after such a long time. 1993 Brazil became the first country to sign a strategic alliance with China. Since then, many achievements have been created over

the next twenty years, and much progress has been made in their interaction. By 2009, China had taken over as Brazil's number-one trade partner. Their cooperation covers everything from infrastructure investment to energy, raw materials, heavy industry, and aerospace (Lessa, 1998). In 2012, relations between Brazil and China were raised to that of a world strategic alliance. In 2017, they created F.O.C.A.C. (the Brazil-China Cooperation Plan for Production Capacity Increase) with a U.S. \$20 billion investment in infrastructure and industrial modernization projects. Facing large fluctuations in the exchange rate for Brazil's currency and its Real in 2002, a domestic panic took root within Brazil. Brazil was determined to establish the vital principles of its foreign policy for the first time at the beginning of the new century.

For this reason, over the first ten years of this century, it actively expanded its alliances and sought to interact with possible future BRICS members. In the 1990s, the reduced number of Brazilian embassies abroad reflected a policy change. This policy was achieved through initial groundwork on five axes. The strategic alliance with Russia gained momentum in 1994 and was pursued mainly through the efforts of Mr. Celso Amorim, who was then foreign minister. When Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov visited Brazil in October 1997, the relationship between the countries was again strengthened. This visit led to the formation of a top-level Brazilian-Russian Commission. Primakov attaches great importance to revitalizing relations with Brazil because of its leadership as the representative of Latin American countries and given the new circumstances on the world stage following the end of the Cold War (Bacigalupo, 2000).

Since the 1960s, India's foreign policy has aimed at economic development, poverty alleviation, and decolonization, playing a significant role in the Non-Aligned Movement. RecallIn the Doha Round of World Trade Organization (W.T.O.) negotiations, November 2001Brazil and India, even with disagreements on (liberalizing) market access for agricultural goods between developing countries, together with some other G20 countries managed to take this round forward to some extent. The cooperation among nations of the South in the framework of the Doha Work Program also brought into trade for the first time a social dimension explicitly designed as a response to the discontent of industrialized countries.

The term post-apartheid is used concerning the era following the end of the apartheid system in South Africa. South Africa has become a key partner for Brazil in Africa, primarily because of its strategic importance in the South Atlantic region. Establishing the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (Z.O.P.A.C.A.S.) in 1986 was a response to Brazil's worries about the presence of foreign entities in the region. More recently, the IBSA Dialogue Forum led to the initiation of naval operations known as I.B.S.A.M.A.R. in 2008: India, Brazil, and South Africa took part in these operations, which have as their aim monitoring hazardous cargoes in the South Atlantic region. According to Monica Hirst, the shared economic expectations that led to the creation of BRIC were crucial to China and Brazil's mutual interests in specific international forums, further solidifying their reputation as prominent global economic actors (Hirst, 2008). However, as these links grew with other countries and BRIC took shape, eventually drawing in the involvement of South Africa, the hope was to help ensure that a new-born global power structure could allow for their rightful place. Some observers expressed skepticism about the inaugural BRIC Summit of June 16, 2009, regarding it as artificial. However, others saw it as a possible way to restore balance and democratize the global system, a viewpoint shared by the

Brazilian government. The summit discussion ranged from the global economic crisis to supporting the restructuring of international financial institutions. It was also considered a Chinese suggestion to find another way to ride an alternative to the dollar. However, the joint statement's major thrust was to achieve a stable, predictable, diversified international monetary system (BRICS, 2009). Their respective roles in the international system were driven by their economic interests.

The importance of Brazil within the BRICS group reflects the developmental needs shared by emerging nations. The emergence of BRICS markets presented an enormous challenge to Western countries' hegemony and revealed new opportunities. The New Development Bank (N.D.B.), established in 2015, met these development needs by marshaling substantial resources of mainly Chinese origin, according to Abdenur & Folly (2015). The N.D.B. Annual Report in 2018 shows a significant increase in business, over twice the amount directly financed compared with the previous year between 2017 and 2018. Ramos et al. (2018) believe that changes in domestic politics within BRICS nations, especially Brazil, and the evolving Russian-Chinese partnership with the United States may have significant implications for economic and development strategies and global security.

Russia's preoccupation with security and China's emphasis on economic interests could significantly reduce the power and influence of BRICS institutions and partnerships. According to Abdenur & Folly (2015, 2018), the new bank demonstrates that the BRICS initiative is being institutionalized. Although it faces challenges from Western hegemony, the N.D.B. is neither opposed to the West nor fundamentally incompatible with it. Nevertheless, in most respects, the project is influenced by domestic political narratives and round shifts inside BRICS member states rather than by development practices. The relationship between foreign policy and development rests on the level of autonomy that parties maintain in international negotiations.

Development needs are vital in determining one's ability to negotiate and establish trust within the international system. Brazil's practical diplomatic tradition matches the structuring of robust foreign policies by utilizing independent financial resources. Abetting their efforts for regional development has unusually BRICS' same countries. By concentrating on South America and the South Atlantic Ocean, its view shared with South Africa, India, China, and Russia, there was a considerable roll call of agreements followed by some impact. As a result, partnerships and leaders in multinational management increasingly shifted their focus from and set up in Southeast Asia to Southeast Asia and the South Atlantic.

Economic Diversification and Growth: A Crucial Objective

Regarding the BRICS framework, the chief goal for Brazil is to build a diversified economy and secure continual economic growth (P.R.C., 2011). The New Development Bank (N.D.B.), created by member states, takes care of infrastructure support and green development programs in BRICS countries (Stuenkel, 2016). It was the N.D.B. that gave financial backing to Brazil's renewable energy projects, e.g., wind power and solar energy. These programs aim to end the country's dependence on fossil fuels and press for a more stable economy (BRICS, 2020; N.D.B., 2022). In this first light of day, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (C.R.A.), a key to busting what amounts to the

international liquidity squeeze, serves as a financial lifeline for Brazil in times of economic crisis (Kheyfets, 2015).

Political Influence and Multilateralism: Reshaping Global Governance

The basis for Brazil to demand reforms of global governance institutions is a larger foreign policy goal; Brazil wants a multipolar world in which new great powers (Brazil, India, etc.) have more of a say on the international stage. (Armijo, 2007; Stuenkel, 2015) Brazil, which is a member of the BRICS alliance, has vigorously sought more equity in representation and decision-making within institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), and the World Bank (Hopewell, 2015; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022). According to Flesmes (2010), Brazil's position reflects its aspiration to a more balanced constellation of international institutions and norms, which also mirrors the shift in global power.

South-South Cooperation: Strengthening Ties with Developing Nations

Brazil has also actively supported South-South cooperation, using its BRICS membership to engage with other developing countries in areas such as technology transfer, education, and health. One example is the BRICS Vaccine R&D Center, established by member states to increase cooperation and coordination in vaccine research and development (BRICS, 2021; Stuenkel, 2016). In addition to addressing global challenges, such programs help consolidate Brazil's position as a leader in South-South relations and its commitment to reducing the gap between developed and developing countries (Pinheiro & Gaio, 2014).

Economic Implications: Trade, Investment, and Infrastructure

Economically, BRICS allowed Brazil to explore more commerce and investment opportunities. As one of the BRICS countries, with China asserting itself as one of Brazil's principal trading partners (Rosales & Kuwayama, 2012; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022), the cone has witnessed tremendous growth in Brazilian exports significantly in the agriculture and mining sectors. The investment given by the N.D.B. for infrastructure projects in Brazil, solving the serious infrastructure gap, has also contributed to its economic competitiveness and connectivity (N.D.B., 2020; Stuenkel, 2016). However, Brazil continues to suffer setbacks in realizing these opportunities due to its heavy reliance on commodity exports within its economy, which makes it very sensitive to the vagaries of the global market and price volatility in Australia (Almeida, 2019; Rosales & Kuwayama, 2012).

Political and Diplomatic Dimensions: Multilateralism and Global Agendas

Brazil's BRICS involvement holds to its political beliefs in multilateralism and the reform of world governance. BRICS also becomes the space for Brazil to work with other emerging nations to address global issues (e.g., the environment, terrorism, and cyber security) (BRICS, 2019; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022). This relationship further consolidates Brazil's place in the world and also its positions on global matters, serving its overarching strategic goal of a multipolar world order (Stuenkel, 2019). But in particular Brazil wants to time its involvement with BRICS while also holding onto its links with western countries such as the United States and the European Union a priority. Furthermore, Brazil adopts a two-

pronged strategy that enables it to respond to complex international contexts and take advantage of its strategic position (Soares et al., 2006). Brazil will cooperate with Western allies on trade and environmental sustainability, while at the same time taking part in BRICS programs for example. This speaks volumes on the practical realism of Brazilian foreign policy (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022).

Regional Implications: Bolstering Leadership in Latin America

As a member of the BRICS, Brazil is positioning itself as regional leader in Latin America. Through its active participation in BRICS projects and initiatives, Brazil has shown strong support for regional development and integration (BRICS Policy Center, 2017). Brazil for instance has indeed, supported infrastructure projects to strengthen connectivity between Latin America and other BRICS countries - an aim that ultimately promotes economic integration as well as regional cooperation (BRICS, 2020). But regional influences in Brazil are not easy. The capacity of Brazil to lead collective project can be called into question by internal political and economic instability (Malamud, 2011). The desire to remain the regional leader means that competition with other Latin American countries can turn a difficult situation even worse when Brazil tries to impose its will and drum up support for its agenda (Malamud, 2011; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022).

Challenges and Opportunities: Navigating Complexities and Maximizing Benefits

While the BRICS framework has numerous prospects for Brazil, the country is confronted with various barriers that prevent it from taking full advantage of such benefits. Internally, political instability and economic volatility can prevent the group from effectively seeking its foreign policy aims (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022). On the outside, it has been argued that the resource materializing of many BRICS interests and priorities requires diplomacy and strategic play (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017). By necessary means, forging overarching alliances with China could irk Western nations or other Latin American states (Stuenkel, 2019).

Although an assortment of challenges confounds Brazil, its continuing presence within BRICS renders some opportunities for enhancing its international reputation, mobilizing capital inflows to develop innovation, and tackling developmental challenges at home (Vieira & Alden, 2011). The creation of this group plays a vital role in enabling Brazil to strengthen its leadership at regional and global levels, as well as in promoting a more just and equitable international system (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2022). The first primary target of Brazil in the BRICS is economic diversification and the far-reaching objective of maintaining prolonged growth. Filling the gap is an entirely different institution, the New Development Bank (N.D.B.), established in 2012 by BRICS nations to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects in member states (Stuenkel, 2016).

Large amounts of money from N.D.B. went to two major areas of renewable energy - wind and solar power in Brazil. These schemes reduce the country's dependence on natural gas to maintain economic prudence and environmental stability (BRICS, 2020; N.D.B., 2022). The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (C.R.A.) - a system meant to supply Brazil with financial assistance during economic crises - is another protection against global liquidity pressures (Kheyfets, 2015).

BRICS on the Brazilian “New Foreign Policy” agenda

In light of recent shifts in Brazilian foreign policy, this article assesses the speeches by Ernesto Araújo as he shares information on vital themes concerning the orientations of Brazil's new foreign policy agenda and its negotiation capacity with BRICS allies. This involves a brief analysis of the path taken by Brazil in relation to BRICS and the announced agenda of the new government to verify new needs, partnerships, and even eventual deepening or divorce propaganda or facts from this association.

The BRICS nations, while outliers in global economic and political arenas, wield significant influence and seek to challenge the dominance of industrialized nations. Rather than severing ties with advanced economies, BRICS aims to encourage more democratic and dynamic paradigms within international institutions. Since their formation, BRICS countries have established bilateral and trilateral mechanisms to foster institutional and commercial cooperation. A key example is the New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2014, which has approved 46 projects totaling \$12.8 billion as of November 2019, demonstrating the group's commitment to cooperative development.

Neumann (2008) emphasized, however, three things: 1) that using an analysis of language-based communication in the social world might lead to the identification of some idiosyncratic features influencing how formal representations are made; 2) that doing so from different conceptual/philosophical perspectives may yield different results; and finally, 3) there might be particular narrative techniques that stand out when looking at such processes. In international relations, this analysis focuses on the narrative around which the object is centered, and an entity is produced. Official speeches are made in public forums, so they do not partake of the ethereal quality found in an article, blog post, or YouTube video. The historical Brazilian foreign policy, with the professionalism and formalism of the diplomats from Itamaraty, was boosted by the speeches of an informal president.

The New Foreign Policy, under the leadership of Jair Bolsonaro and coordination by Ernesto Araújo, intends to break with the former paradigms — they consolidated during 12 years of the Workers' Party running the nation. The desire to identify more closely with the United States has had implications for future foreign policy decisions. It is an alignment with the national identity perspective of the government. Araújo is set to implement a "Nationalist" policy next year, based on his inauguration address for the Brazilian foreign minister. He explicitly cited countries like Israel, the United States, Latin American nations liberated from regimes of the São Paulo Forum, and others that have been fighting tyranny as they do in Venezuela (Araujo, 2019).

This is a nationalism that conforms to Western norms and marries economic freedom with conservative Christian-based moral values. The 2018 election new Brazilian nationalism understands variety and plurality as threats to economic success and permanence, labeling them "globalism" the government declares having won against in the elections. According to Araujo (2019b), Brazil has resorted to a strategy of economic liberty anchored on a solid national identity, proving the inherent relationship between economic freedom and civic principles. While Brazil is one of the staunchest U.S. allies, economic realities will force the country to preserve its relationships with key commercial partners like China (Brazil's largest trading partner) and members of the BRICS multinational group. Brazilian pragmatism began to emerge throughout 2019 as—despite

rhetoric from foreign minister Ernesto Araújo that took increasing aim at China-- the change in tone was slowly matched by a move away from rhetoric, culminating in positions much more in line with where we found ourselves during the 11th BRICS Summit hosted in Brasilia. Last year, Araújo (2019b) expressed his skepticism about the scope of commerce and trade's capacity to erode liberal democracy at the time he was making a presentation at the Informal Ministerial Meeting of the W.T.O.

The government needs the military to balance defense, energy, and foreign policy. So, the 2019 BRICS Summit has the emergence of cooperation as a top priority even more within the investments of the New Development Bank (N.D.B.) in key areas. The 2020 projects span multiple industries, from infrastructure to energy, sustainability, digital systems, and transportation. These initiatives demonstrate the common agenda of the BRICS nations for meeting the development needs of their member countries.

In 2019, with JairBolsonaro leading Brazil, the BRICS prioritized economic growth, scientific and technological development, and innovation. The BRICS members have already called for the imperative of the group to continue promoting global economic growth: such was a theme during the June 2019 G20 conference. They called for the undertaking of structural reforms, the promotion of innovation, and the improvement of cooperation between nations to address poverty and advance digital connectivity. During his address at the 11th BRICS Summit, Bolsonaro emphasized that opportunities for partnerships in BRICS should exist because of the economic power of these countries and cited research and innovation as essential areas for coordinated collaborations within BRICS (Bolsonaro, 2019).

Although Brazil's new foreign policy experienced a practical change during the BRICS Summit, it remains anchored in economic liberalism and ethical notions that belong to the ideals of the West. Ernesto Araújo, speaking at Angola's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 2019, heralded Brazil as a Western nation, describing the Western legacy shared by more than just Europe (Araujo, 2019d). Foreign Policy also proposes that The New Foreign Policy adheres to Western values, including Christianity, while bolstering long-standing relationships with non-Western countries. This includes China, the most important Brazilian commercial partner, and some Islamic countries that might interpret this shift as support for a spilled cultural offensive. As a result, the New Foreign Policy is marked by backtracking to an American-centric stance, aligning Brazilian interests with those of the U.S. and far less collaboration among the group of emerging nations that are explicitly not American, like other members of BRICS. The action may strain Brazil's relations with several of its international partners.

CONCLUSION

Brazil's foreign policy reflects a nuanced balance of its BRICS-related objectives with those in other regions and global governance scenarios. As a member of BRICS, Brazil is using this block to enlarge its footprint on the global stage to expand economic relations and promote a more just world order. Due to the fact that of the commitment obligations leading from becoming a complete member in BRICS group within the middle power, which motivates the nation to work together with developing states, improve economic so as to confront worldwide problems side by side with other raising countries. As a strategic platform to channel regionalism into global trade, climate change, and international governance reform questions, the BRICS framework enabled Brazil to

expand its influence around the emerging powers. Being part of BRICS, Brazil leverages this to offer China and India the chance of significant economic opportunities while also undermining a host of Western-centric institutions. Brazil's experience as an intimate interlocutor in BRICS endeavors, such as the New Development Bank (NBD), has thereby only redoubled Brazil's eagerness for building articulations around potential facilities to fund more sustainable development and infrastructural projects at home and abroad. In this way, Brazilian foreign policy also advocates for the goal of managing Latin America, integrating with regional organizations such as MERCOSUL and C.E.L.A.C. Brazil also seeks greater diplomatic and trade ties with other global powers. To be involved also in regional blocks could not exceed the active part they already play in blocks such as BRICS - which is part and parcel of a policy to pursue strategic independence, preventing Brazil from becoming excessively dependent on any one group or country.

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