Enhancing Computer Security through Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols Using Model Checking and Partial Order Techniques

Abstract

This study explores the integration of partial, order reduction techniques with model checking to enhance the verification of cryptographic protocols. Cryptographic, protocols are essential for securing digital communications, and data; however, ensuring their robustness and reliability through traditional verification methods can be challenging due to, their complexity and the vast number of potential executions, paths. This research utilizes the SPIN, model checker and PROMELA language to model and verify three types of, cryptographic protocols: a basic authentication handshake, an encrypted data transfer, protocol, and a complex, multi-factor authentication process. Each protocol was, verified with and, without the application of partial order reduction techniques. The findings demonstrate that partial order, reduction, not only significantly reduces the computational resources, required—by approximately 40%—but also maintains the thoroughness needed to identify critical, security flaws such as replay, attacks, data integrity breaches, and authentication failures. This study, underscores the, efficacy of combining partial order reduction with model, checking, proposing that this, approach significantly improves the scalability and efficiency, of cryptographic protocol, verification. The results advocate, for the continued development and application of these, techniques to ensure the secure and reliable deployment of cryptographic protocols in various digital environments